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Abstract. We present a simple model of international trade (IT) and growth.
The model yields a unique equilibrium path in which the relationship between
exogenous and endogenous variables does not resemble the equations estimated
by the empirical literature: Ours are not linear, despite the fact that technology
and demand are linear, they do not include variables used in this literature like
shares of IT and investment and include variables that have never been used
in this literature such as comparative and absolute advantage, specialization
patterns, saving habits and technology of partner countries. Finally, the impact
of the initial level of income and the number of years that the economy has
been open is far more complicated than had been assumed by the literature.
1. Introduction. The question of the link between International Trade (IT) and
growth is a popular issue outside our profession. What do we have to say about it?
On the one hand we have general theoretical results on the performance of open
economies that provide conditions for the convergence to a steady state and study its
properties.1. On the other hand, the empirical literature presents conflicting views
on this relationship: Some authors maintain that a positive relationship between
these two variables shows up in the data. Others are skeptical about it.2 This
literature is so huge that it is impossible to summarize here, but examples of the
former are [9] and [18] while examples of the latter are [13] and [17]. A characteristic
of the empirical literature is the emphasis on sophisticated methods of estimation
-see [19] for a recent entry- and not on deriving the estimated equations from a
formal model.
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1See [2], [3], [5], [6],[10], [14], [15], [20], and [21]. For a survey of the results on comparative
dynamics see [7]
2One branch of this literature uses cross-country regressions to search for linkages between
growth rates and other variables. Another branch concentrates on the dynamic paths followed by
a country or group of countries, especially after a major trade liberalization (TL).
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This paper presents a simple model of trade and growth that attempts to start
a bridge between theory and empirical studies. The only similar work is by [23].3
Our model is a blend of a two sector Ricardian model where trade is driven by
differences in technology (comparative advantage) and capital is the only factor of
production, and the Harrod-Domar-Rebelo model of endogenous growth in which
consumption is linear with income.4 In these three models, in equilibrium, capital
grows at a constant rate.5
In our model equilibrium is unique and can be of three possible kinds that we
will call regimes: 1) Both countries completely specialize. 2) Only the country with
a comparative advantage in consumption goods (country B) specializes. 3) Only
the country with a comparative advantage in capital goods (country A) specializes.
We find that the growth rate of country A is the same in the three regimes. But
the growth rate of country B is different in each of these regimes. The dynamics of
the model follows three possible trajectories. Each of this trajectories ends in one
of the regimes, irrespective of the initial capital stock. Thus in our model, unlike
Harrod-Domar-Rebelo’s, there is transitional dynamics.
Our model yields predictions that look very different from the models employed
by the empirical literature, namely:
- Even in the simplest cases, relationships between exogenous and endogenous
variables are not linear: They are piecewise linear or multiplicative with each spe-
cialization pattern yielding a different equation.6
- Some variables used by the empirical literature as exogenous variables, like the
shares of investment or IT in GDP, are endogenous. This point has been already
noticed but the usual defense is that these variables are used as a proxy of other,
non quantifiable, variables. We show that in some cases the intended relationship
between any of these shares and the growth rate either does not exists or it goes
in opposite direction to the one assumed before. Moreover in some cases these two
variables are in a one-to-one relationship so both should not be used at the same
time.
- Other variables play a role that is different from the one assumed by this
literature like the initial level of income and the number of years that the economy
has been open. Trade distortions -that in our case take the extreme form of autarky-
affect growth in a very complicated way.
- Finally, variables that are important in our model have been neglected by the
applied literature, such as comparative and absolute advantage, specialization pat-
terns and saving habits and technology of partner countries. Once the mechanism
that operates behind these variables is understood, it is difficult to think of a model
where they do not play a role.
3In order to concentrate on the fundamentals, our model leaves aside important topics like
oligopoly, asymmetric information, externalities and any possible “friction”. Innovation, a topic
of paramount empirical relevance, is also disregarded, see [11]. Also we only consider equilibrium
states leaving aside any stability analysis of equilibrium.
4In [8] and [21], this follows from their assumption that consumption depends linearly on
income. In [16], in which a representative consumer maximizes an intertemporal utility function,
this occurs because of the special form of the utility function.
5An important part of the theory of IT is based on the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS)
model with two factors. Our model is capable of incorporating a second factor under additional
assumptions on technology, see the Appendix. Moreover, [3] has shown that the long run equilib-
rium of the HOS model displays Ricardian features. In particular “ countries specialize according
to comparative advantage”.
6The equations estimated by the empirical literature are, almost invariably, linear.
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What do we learn from here? On the negative side the main lesson from our
paper is that a simple model of IT and growth produces results that are far from
the “common sense” equations that have been estimated. On the positive side, our
model provides a deeper understanding of the mechanism of trade and growth, some
cautions about those already used, and a fresh set of variables to be used. In any
case, more work is necessary to produce a workable theoretical model and to test
the implications.
The rest of the paper goes as follows: Section 2 presents the model, Section 3
discusses the empirical implications and Section 4 concludes. An Appendix extends
the model to international capital mobility and two factors.
2. The model . We assume two countries, A and B, and two goods: a consumption
good and a capital good. Capital can be understood as physical, human or social.
For simplicity we will assume that capital does not depreciate. The aggregate stock
of capital in country i = A,B is denoted by Ki. The quantity of capital used in the
production of the consumption (resp. capital) good is denoted by KiC (resp. K
i
I)
i = A,B. Capital is mobile between sectors and fully utilized. Thus
Ki = KiC +K
i
I , i = A,B. (1)
Capital is assumed to be immobile between countries. In an Appendix we prove
that if consumer tastes are identical between countries, the main conclusions of this
paper hold under international capital mobility. We assume that output is produced
by means of capital alone. We may introduce a second factor, labor, whose supply
(including emigrants) is arbitrarily large. Then, either wages are at subsistence
level (normalized to zero), or, in each country, capital-labor ratios are identical in
each sector. The later interpretation is developed in an Appendix were it is shown
that our main conclusions hold under this additional assumption.
Production takes place under constant returns to scale. The production function
of consumption and capital goods in country i = A,B is
CiO = β
i
CK
i
C and I
i
O = β
i
IK
i
I , (2)
where CiO (resp. I
i
O) stands for the output of consumption (resp. capital) good
(hence the subindex) and βiI and β
i
C are the average productivity of capital in
country i in the production of capital (βiI) and consumption (β
i
C) goods.
For international trade to be mutually advantageous and without loss of gener-
ality we assume that
βBI
βBC
<
βAI
βAC
, (3)
i.e., country A (resp. B) has a comparative advantage in the production of the
capital (resp. consumption) good.
Let P i be price of the consumption good in country i. The price of the output of
the capital good is the numeraire. Let ri be the rental price of capital in country
i. We will assume that firms are price-takers. Since production takes place under
constant returns to scale, profit maximization implies no positive profits. In partic-
ular if a good is produced, revenues should cover exactly its production costs. And
if a good is not produced, revenues cannot exceed costs. In the sequel, subscript O
refers to the output in the country in the superscript. Supply side is characterized
by the following equations:
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P iCiO ≤ riKiC or βiCP i ≤ ri and if strict inequality holds CiO = 0. (4)
IiO ≤ riKiI or βiI ≤ ri and if strict inequality holds IiO = 0. (5)
Let Y i = riKi be national income in country i. When there is trade between
countries we have to distinguish between output and where the goods are allocated.
So let IiD, i = A,B be the new capital goods allocated to country i and C
i
D be
the demand for consumption goods in country i. This demand is assumed to be of
Keynesian type, i.e., consumption is linear on real income,
CiD =
ciY i
P i
0 < ci < 1 i = A,B. (6)
In the conclusions we discuss how to obtain this function from utility maximiza-
tion. Demand for investment in country i, (IiD) is assumed to be
IiD = Y
i − c
iY i
P i
P i = (1− ci)Y i (7)
so all income is spent either in consumption or in capital goods. Finally let gi be
the rate of growth of capital in country i defined as
gi =
K˙i
Ki
where K˙i is the increase in the capital stock. Since there is no depreciation
K˙i = IiD.
As we will see, in equilibrium, all the relevant variables depend on the capital stock.
And the rate of growth of any variable can be easily calculated from gi.
Firstly let us consider that capital is given. In this case the model is a two
sector Ricardian model. We solve the model for the case of autarky and for all
the possibilities opened up by free trade. The dynamic paths of the economy when
investment accrues the capital stock will be considered later on.
2.1. Autarky. In this regime we do not have to distinguish between production
and demand so we drop the corresponding subscript for C and I. Equilibrium values
of the variables under autarky are denoted with the superscript ∗. From equations
(2), (4), (5) and (6), i = A,B we obtain,
Ii∗ = βiI(1− ci)Ki. Ci∗ = ciβiCKi. ri∗ = βiI . (8)
gi∗ = βiI(1− ci). P i∗ =
βiI
βiC
. (9)
Notice that under autarky the rate of growth equals the propensity to save (1−ci)
divided by the capital-output ratio 1/βiI of the capital goods sector. This is exactly
the (warranted) rate of growth in the Harrod-Domar model.
Next, suppose that both countries open up to international trade. Now we delete
the superscript of P , since now domestic prices are international prices. Finally, we
introduce a new variable,
ii ≡ V alue of Trade
Income of i
. (10)
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ii measures the relative importance of trade in national income of country i.
To see all possible cases of specialization, consider Table 1 below. The first two
entries in the main diagonal are impossible (marked I) because (6) requires that
both goods must be produced. Any cell in which a country specializes in a good
in which it has comparative disadvantage is marked VCA (violates comparative
advantage). This leaves only three possibilities that we explore in turn. See the
Appendix for the calculations.
Country B
Country A
Consump. good only Cap. good only Both goods
Consump. good only I V C A V C A
Cap. good only Complete Spec. I A specializes
Both goods B specializes V C A V C A
Table 1
2.2. Complete specialization. In this regime, Country A produces capital goods
only and Country B produces consumption goods only. We denote equilibrium
variables by an upper bar. From equations (2), (5), (6) and (10) we obtain for
Countries A and B
I¯AD = β
A
I (1− cA)KA. C¯AD = (1− cB)βBCKB . r¯A = βAI . ı¯A = cA. (11)
I¯BD = β
A
I c
AKA. C¯BD = c
BβBCK
B . r¯B =
βAI c
AKA
(1− cB)KB . ı¯
B = 1− cB . (12)
From (4), (11) and (12) it is easily seen that
g¯A = βAI (1− cA). g¯B =
βAI c
AKA
KB
. P¯ =
βAI c
AKA
(1− cB)KBβBC
. (13)
Supply equations (4) and (5) boil down to
(1− cB)βBI
cAβAI
≤ K
A
KB
≤ (1− c
B)βBC
cAβAC
. (14)
We call this regime Complete Specialization. It occurs for intermediate values of
KA/KB .
2.3. Country B specializes in consumption goods. In this regime, Country
A produces both goods and country B specializes in the consumption good. We
denote equilibrium variables by a hat. From equations (2), (5), (6) and (10) we
obtain for Countries A and B
IˆAD = β
A
I (1−cA)KA. CˆAD = cAβACKA. rˆA = βAI . ıˆA =
βBC (1− cB)KB
βACK
A
. (15)
IˆBD =
βBC (1− cB)KBβAI
βAC
. CˆBD = c
BKBβBC . rˆ
B =
βAI β
B
C
βAC
. ıˆB = 1− cB . (16)
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From (4), (15) and (16) it is easily seen that
gˆA = βAI (1− cA). gˆB =
βBCβ
A
I (1− cB)
βAC
. Pˆ =
βAI
βAC
. (17)
Supply equations (4) and (5) boil down to
KA
KB
>
(1− cB)βBC
cAβAC
(or cA > ıˆA). (18)
We call this regime Country B Specializes. It occurs for large values of KA/KB .
2.4. Country A specializes in capital goods. In this regime Country A special-
izes in the capital good and country B produces both goods. We denote equilibrium
variables by a tilde. From equations (2), (5), (6) and (10) we obtain for Countries
A and B
I˜AD = β
A
I K
A(1− cA). C˜AD =
cAβAI K
AβBC
βBI
. r˜A = βAI . ı˜
A = cA. (19)
I˜BD = β
B
I (1− cB)KB . C˜BD = cBβBCKB . r˜B = βBI . ı˜B =
cAβAI K
A
βBI K
B
. (20)
From (4), (19) and (20) it is easily seen that
g˜A = βAI (1− cA). g˜B = βBI (1− cB). P˜ =
βBI
βBC
. (21)
Supply equations (4) and (5) boil down to:
(1− cB)βBI
cAβAI
>
KA
KB
(or 1− cB > ı˜B). (22)
We call this regime Country A Specializes. It occurs for small values of KA/KB .
It is the only regime in which growth rates of both countries equal those under
autarky.
The previous results are summarized in the following two propositions. Proposi-
tion 1 spells the conditions of occurrence of the three regimes under free trade.
Proposition 1. a) When the capital in Country A is small in relationship to the
capital in Country B, Country A specializes in the production of capital goods and
Country B produces both goods. Mathematically
(1− cB)βBI
cAβAI
>
KA
KB
b) When the capital in Country A is large in relationship to the capital in Country
B, Country B specializes in the production of consumption goods and Country A
produces both goods. Mathematically
KA
KB
>
(1− cB)βBC
cAβAC
c) In the remaining case, both countries specialize in the production of the good they
have comparative advantage. Mathematically
(1− cB)βBI
cAβAI
≤ K
A
KB
≤ (1− c
B)βBC
cAβAC
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Proposition 1 says that when a country has a large capital relative to the other
country, in the free trade equilibrium this country specializes in the production of
the good it has comparative advantage. When neither country has a large relative
capital, both specialize.
The next proposition focus on the growth rates.
Proposition 2. a) In all regimes, gA is constant and equal to βAI (1− cA).
b) Under complete specialization, gB equals βAI c
AKA/KB so is linearly increasing
on KA/KB.
c) In any other regime, gB is constant. It equals the autarkic growth rate when
Country A Specializes and is larger than the autarkic rate in the other regimes.
Part a) of Proposition 2 is reminiscent of a classical result in von Neumann-
Leontief-Sraffa models that if the economy can be partitioned such that there are
sectors whose input-output matrix is indecomposable, the common rate of growth of
these sectors can be calculated using the technology of these sectors only. It implies
that for the country with comparative advantage in the production of capital, free
trade has no impact on its growth rate: it only has a level effect. Parts b) and c)
imply that the impact of free trade on the growth of the country with a comparative
advantage in consumption goods is not straightforward. It may increase the growth
rate or it may have only a level effect. In particular, if free trade makes the other
country to specialize, free trade has no effect on growth.
We now turn our attention to the consequences of capital accumulation under
free trade. We have three possibilities which we study in turn.
2.5. The growth rate of A is always greater than the growth rate of B.
i.e. gA > gB everywhere. This occurs iff
βBI (1− cB) < βAI (1− cA) and βBC (1− cB) < βAC (1− cA)
or
1− cA
1− cB > max{
βBI
βAI
,
βBC
βAC
} = β
B
C
βAC
(23)
where the last equality follows from (3). The left hand side can be interpreted as
the advantage of country A in savings and the right hand side is the advantage
of country B in the production of the consumption good. The interpretation is
that country B has a low advantage in capital accumulation and in the production
of the consumption good (which is the good in which country B has comparative
advantage). In this case country B grows at a lower pace than country A. If tastes
are identical in both countries, this case occurs iff βAC > β
B
C . Thus in our model,
absolute advantage may matter. Note that this case implies that in autarky, A
grows faster than B. We will refer to this case as “A Grows Faster than B”.
In Figure 1, we have pictured this case in which for KA/KB ∈ [0, 2] only country
A specializes, for KA/KB ∈ [2, 4] both countries specialize and for KA/KB > 4
only country B specializes. The dashed (resp. solid) line is A’s (B’s) growth rate.
2.6. The growth rate of B is always greater than the growth rate of A.
i.e. gB > gA everywhere. This occurs iff
βBI (1− cB) > βAI (1− cA) and βBC (1− cB) > βAC (1− cA)
7
Figure 1.
or
1− cA
1− cB < min{
βBI
βAI
,
βBC
βAC
} = β
B
I
βAI
(24)
This is the polar case to the previous one and it has a similar interpretation. In
particular this case implies that in autarky, B grows faster than A. We will refer to
this case as “B Grows Faster than A”.
In Figure 2, we have pictured this case for the same values of the specialization
intervals as in Figure 1. The dashed (resp. solid) line is A’s (B’s) growth rate.
Figure 2.
2.7. The growth rate of A is sometimes greater, sometimes smaller than
the growth rate of B. This case occurs iff
βBI (1− cB) < βAI (1− cA) and βBC (1− cB) > βAC (1− cA)
or
8
βBI
βAI
<
1− cA
1− cB <
βBC
βAC
(25)
In this case the advantage of country A in savings is between the relative ad-
vantages of countries A and B. If tastes are identical in the two countries, this
case occurs when country A (resp. B) has absolute advantage in the production of
capital (consumption) goods. We will refer to this case as “Growth of A and B
can go either way”.
In Figure 3, we have pictured this case for the same values of the specialization
intervals as in Figures 1 and 2. The dashed (resp. solid) line is A’s (B’s) growth
rate. The intersection of both growth rates is at (1 − cA)/cA. In this point, the
ratio of capitals equals the ratio of exports of A and B.
Figure 3.
Our next result studies the dynamic trajectory of the capital ratio and the special-
ization patterns. We show that countries always end in one specialization pattern
and that this pattern does not depend on the initial condition.
Proposition 3. Starting from any initial value of KA/KB:
a) When “Growth of A and B can go either way”, KA/KB→(1−cA)/cA and, in
the limit, both countries specialize. The rate of growth of B converge to the growth
rate of A, namely βAI (1− cA).
b) When “A Grows Faster than B”, KA/KB →∞ and, in the limit, country B
specializes. The difference between growth rates decreases in the complete special-
ization regime but it is constant in the other two regimes.
c) When “B Grows Faster than A” KA/KB → 0 and, in the limit, country A
specializes. The difference between growth rates decreases in the complete special-
ization regime and it is constant in the other two regimes.
Proof. a) Firstly, suppose that country B specializes. But there,
gˆA = βAI (1− cA) < gˆB =
βBCβ
A
I (1− cB)
βAC
.
Thus KA/KB decreases and we end up in the regime of complete specialization.
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Secondly, suppose that country A specializes, g˜A = βAI (1 − cA) > g˜B = βBI (1 −
cB). Thus, KA/KB grows and we will end up in the regime of complete specializa-
tion.
Finally if both countries specialize and g¯A < g¯B the rate of growth of country B
(= βAI c
AKA/KB) decreases up to the point in which it equals the rate of growth
of country A. If g¯A > g¯B , the opposite occurs. Thus,
g¯A = βAI (1− cA) = g¯B =
βAI c
AKA
KB
and
KA
KB
=
1− cA
cA
.
b) Notice that here, gA > gB . Thus KA/KB increases with time and, no matter the
initial value of KA/KB is, we end up with country B specialized. In this regime
the rate of growth of capital of country B is the largest among all equilibrium rates.
c) Virtually identical to b) above.
The proof of Proposition 3 follows essentially from a look to Figures 1 (for part
b)), 2 (for part c)) and 3 (for part a)).
From the proof of Proposition 3 we see that the following trajectories are possible:
1. B Specializes ⇒ Complete Specialization. This is the first case in part a) of
the proof of Proposition 3..
2. A Specializes ⇒ Complete Specialization. This is the second case in part a)
of the proof of Proposition 3.
3. A Specializes ⇒ Complete Specialization ⇒ B Specializes. This is part b) of
the proof of Proposition 3.
4. B Specializes. ⇒ Complete Specialization ⇒ A specializes. This is part c) of
the proof of Proposition 3.
The first and the third possibilities generate a growth rate for country B that
is constant, then increasing and then constant and the second and the fourth pos-
sibilities generate a growth rate for B that is constant, then decreasing and then
constant. Any part of these trajectories are possible too. Finally note that, de-
pending on the parameters of the economy, any regime may be the limit of the
accumulation process or it may send the capital ratio to the neighbor regime.
3. Empirical Implications. In this section we highlight the implications of our
model and compare with the set up employed by some papers of the empirical lit-
erature.
1. Functional forms. There is not a single functional form that relates exoge-
nous variables to growth rates: Country A always grows at the same rate, under
autarky or under any specialization pattern. In country B, functional forms depend
on specialization patterns and trading opportunities. And when functional forms
are stable, switching from autarky to free trade has no effect on growth.
Equations are not linear despite the linearity assumed throughout the model.
They are piecewise linear or multiplicative so they are captured better using loga-
rithms.
2. Variables used. The following variables have been linked to growth by the
empirical literature:
i): Share of IT in GDP.
ii): Investment share.
iii): Exchange Rate and/or Trade distortions.
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iv): Initial level of Income.
v): Number of years that the economy has been open.
We see immediately the problem with i): The share of IT in GDP is not an
independent variable: In other words, both the share of IT and the growth rate
depend on the fundamentals of the economy but there is no causation at all between
them. If this variable is used as a proxy, notice that under complete specialization
or if A specializes gA = βAI (1 − iA) -so we get a negative relationship!- and if B
specializes gˆA is independent of iA and iB . In the case of B, g¯B = βAI ı¯
AKA/KB ,
gˆB = βBCβ
A
I ıˆ
B/βAC and g˜
B is independent of iA and iB . Thus, our model does not
support the view that to introduce the share of IT in GDP in the equations to be
estimated is a good idea.
The problem with ii), the investment share -which equals 1 − ci- is that under
complete specialization B′s rate of growth does not depend on 1−cB , but positively
on cA! Thus if we have in our sample many countries completely specialized in
consumption goods, the relationship between gi and 1− ci will be blurred.
iii) measures how changes in trade barriers affect growth. In our model these
changes take the simple form of switching from autarky to free trade. Despite this
simplification this effect can not be captured by an additive dummy variable: Growth
in country A is unaffected (the only effect is a level effect) and, in country B, the
following possibilities may arise after a Trade Liberalization (TL):
- No effect at all. This occurs if after TL A specializes and 8 holds.
- Level effect only : This occurs if after a TL A specializes and 5-7 hold. In this
case gB increases and remains constant thereafter.
- No effect in the short run. Acceleration until a certain point later on. This
occurs if after a TL A specializes and 5 holds. Under 6 both growth rates converge
and under 7 they just approach each other.
- Acceleration in the short run and constancy thereafter. This occurs if after a
TL both countries specialize and 5 holds. Under 6 both growth rates converge and
under 7 they just approach each other.
- Level effect, deceleration and growth like in autarky later on. This occurs under
8 if after a TL either B specializes or both countries specialize. In the first case the
new growth rate is maintained for a while.
- Level effect, deceleration and convergence. This occurs under 5 and 6 if after a
TL either B specializes or both countries specialize.
iv), the initial level of income is inversely related in neoclassical models to the
growth rate. Here for country B it is related in a piecewise linear way with relative
capital stocks that determine specialization patterns. Clearly, initial level of income
is an imperfect measure of relative capital stocks.
v), the number of years that the economy has been open, determines in our model
the switch between specialization patterns. But the relationship between the latter
and the growth rate depends on the relative initial capital stock -that determines
the initial position- and growth rates of past periods -that determines the amount
of time that a country spends in a given specialization pattern.
3. Variables omitted. We see that rates of growth depend on variables that,
to the best of my knowledge, do not appear in the empirical literature like:
I) Comparative advantage in the production of capital or consumption goods.
II) Relative stock of capital and specialization patterns.
III) Saving habits and technology of partner countries.
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It is unlikely that such variables could be absent in more complicated models.
In fact, it is surprising that such variables have been forgotten because their role
is clear: I) Countries with comparative advantage in goods that make the economy
grow, behave differently than countries with no such advantage. For instance, the
former countries are less likely to be affected by opening to trade or by tariffs.
II) Relative size matters, because this size shapes specialization patterns that, in
turn, explains supply. III) When development is demand oriented and capital goods
are imported and paid with exports of consumption goods, characteristics of trade
partners are important. And specialization patterns depend in the long run on
relative growth rates.
4. Conclusions. In this paper we show that even in a simple model of inter-
national trade where all relationships in the basic economy are linear, the exact
relationship between trade and growth cannot be captured by a single equation.7 It
is clear that a full assessment of the impact of trade on growth needs a complicated
model with general assumptions on factors, technology, etc., and where imperfec-
tions of competition and information play an important role. But it is unlikely
that in such a model the relationship between growth and other variables would be
simpler than in our model.
A possible criticism of our paper is that our assumption of a constant fraction
of income devoted to savings is not based on utility maximization. When the
economy is always completely specialized there is a utility function that provides
microfoundations to this assumption (see [4] p. 531). But when the economy
moves between specialization patterns, it is not clear which preferences yield such
an assumption. In any case, most of our remarks in Section 3 are still valid with
a variable saving rate because they remain applicable for any given savings rate.
Predictions of a trade liberalization still hold as long as there is no switch from one
specialization pattern to another. In any case, if the linear relationship between
consumption and income is lost we should expect that the relationship between
trade and growth becomes even more complicated.
Another criticism of our paper is that an important part of the theory of interna-
tional trade is based on the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model with two factors and
a differentiable production function. But our model is capable of incorporating a sec-
ond factor under additional assumptions on technology, see Appendix. Again, more
general assumptions will produce even more complicated models. Moreover, [3] (p.
713) has shown that the long run equilibrium of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
model displays Ricardian features. In particular “countries specialize according to
comparative advantage”. Finally, such a model produces very often only level effects
(see [14] p. 12). Our model is capable of producing level and growth effects.
What do we learn from our exercise other than the complexity of the issue? On
this count our model suggests, at least, three things.
1. The relevance of variables not considered so far like comparative and absolute
advantage, relative capital stock and consumption habits and technology of
partner countries.
2. Some variables used so far, like the trade share, the savings rate, etc. do not
play the role that they were assumed to play.
3. Logarithmic and piecewise linear functional forms may capture the intended
relationships better.
7See [1] for a similar point based in the european experience.
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We hope that our paper encourages other researchers to build models of growth
and international trade (for instance based on the Solow model) and explore their
properties
5. Appendix .
5.1. The model with mobile capital between countries. Assume that capital
flows from the country with the lowest rental rate to the country with the highest
rental rate. We will see that the dynamic analysis presented in Proposition 3 still
valid if cA = cB . This condition corresponds to the assumption often made in
International Trade that tastes are identical in both countries. Recall that:
Under complete specialization, r¯A = βAI and r¯
B =
βAI c
AKA
(1− cB)KB . (26)
If country B specializes, rˆA = βAI and rˆ
B =
βAI β
B
C
βAC
. (27)
If country A specializes, r˜A = βAI and r˜
B = βBI . (28)
There are three possible cases:
- rA > rB for all KA/KB . In this case, capital flows from B to A. (27) implies
that βAC > β
B
C . Notice that if c
A = cB this is just (23). There gA > gB without
capital mobility, so this tendency is reinforced by capital mobility.
- rA < rB for all KA/KB . In this case capital flows from A to B. (27) implies
that βAI < β
B
I . Notice that if c
A = cB this case is just (24) in the main text. In
this case gB > gA without capital mobility, so this tendency is reinforced by capital
mobility.
- rA > (resp. ¡) rB for some values of KA/KB. This case arises when
βAI < β
B
I . Notice that if c
A = cB this case is identical to (25) in the main text. For
KA/KB > (resp. <) (1− cA)/cA, rB > (resp. ¡) rA, so capital flows from B (resp.
A) to A (resp. B). These conditions match exactly those in the model without
capital mobility.
5.2. The model with a second factor. If output is produced by capital and
labor (denoted by L), supply equations read P iCiO ≤ piiKiC + wiLiC and IiO ≤
piiKiI + w
iLiI , where now pi
i (resp. wi) stands for the rental price of capital (resp.
wages) in country i. Let liC (resp. l
i
I) be the labor/capital ratio in country i in sector
C (resp. I). Thus, LiC ≡ liCKiC and LiI ≡ liIKiI . If we assume that liI ≡ liC ≡ li,
supply equations read P iCiO ≤ (pii+wili)KiC and IiO ≤ (pii+wili)KiI . By redefining
ri ≡ (pii + wili) we obtain the equations for the model without labor. The model
yields a linear wage-profit frontier, familiar to the researchers of linear models. It
is customary to close these models by assuming some kind of bargaining between
capitalist and workers.
5.3. Derivation of the equations in Sections2.2, 2.3, and 2.4.
SUBSECTION 2.2. COMPLETE SPECIALIZATION From (4) and (5) we ob-
tain that βBCP = r
B and βAI = r
A.
From (2), consumption output = βBCK
B
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From (6), consumption demand =
cAY A
P
+
cBY B
P
=
cArAKA
P
+
cBrBKB
P
=
cAβAI K
A
P
+
cBβBCPK
B
P
=
cAβAI K
A
P
+ cBβBCK
B =
cAβAI K
A
I
P
+ cBβBCK
B
C .
And since consumption supply = consumption demand
βBCK
B =
cAβAI K
A
P
+ cBβBCK
B
βBCK
B(1− cB) = c
AβAI K
A
P
⇒ P = c
AβAI K
A
βBCK
B(1− cB)
rB = βBCP = β
B
C
cAβAI K
A
βBCK
B(1− cB) =
cAβAI K
A
KB(1− cB)
CAD =
cAβAI K
A
P
=
cAβAI K
A
cAβAI K
A
βBCK
B(1− cB) = βBCKB(1− cB)
CBD = c
BβBCK
B .
From (7) for country A
IAD = β
A
I K
A − βBCKB(1− cB)
cAβAI K
A
βBCK
B(1− cB) = β
A
I (1− cA)KA.
And for country B
IBD =
cAβAI K
A
KB(1− cB)K
B − cBβBCKB
cAβAI K
A
βBCK
B(1− cB) = c
AβAI K
A.
Finally (4) and (5) imply that
βACP ≤ rA βBI ≤ rB
βAC
cAβAI K
A
βBCK
B(1− cB) ≤ β
A
I β
B
I ≤
cAβAI K
A
KB(1− cB)
KA
KB
≤ β
B
C (1− cB)
βAC c
A
βBI (1− cB)
cAβAI
≤ K
A
KB
.
SUBSECTION 2.3. B SPECIALIZES IN CONSUMPTION GOODS ,
From (4) and (5) we obtain
βACP = r
A, βAI = r
A, P =
βAI
βAC
, βBCP = r
B , rB =
βBCβ
A
I
βAC
.
From the definition of national income,
Y A = rAKA = βAI K
A, Y B = rBKB =
βBCβ
A
I K
B
βAC
.
From (7),
IAD = β
A
I (1− cA)KA, IBD = (1− cB)Y B =
(1− cB)βBCβAI KB
βAC
.
From (6)
CAD =
cAY A
P
= cAβACK
A, CBD =
cBY B
P
= cBβBCK
B .
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SUBSECTION 2.4. A SPECIALIZES IN CAPITAL GOODS From (4) and (5)
we obtain
βAI = r
A, βBI = r
B , βBCP = r
B , P =
βBI
βBC
.
From the definition of national income,
Y A = rAKA = βAI K
A, Y B = rBKB = βBI K
B .
From (7)
IA = (1− cA)βAI KA, IB = (1− cB)βBI KB .
From (6)
CA =
cAY A
P
=
cAβAI K
AβBC
βBI
, CB =
cBY B
P
= cBKBβBC .
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